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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Brant Lee Eversole appeals from his judgment of conviction for driving under the
influence of alcohol. Mr. Eversole pleaded guilty but preserved the right to appeal from
the denial of his pre-trial motions. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress because State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), has been abrogated
by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Alternatively, if this Court
believes that Diaz has not been abrogated by McNeely, Mr. Eversole asserts that Diaz
should be overruled. He also asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion
to dismiss.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Eversole with charged with felony Driving Under the Influence (hereinafter,
DUI), I.C. §§ 18-8004(1)(a), 18-8005(9).

(R., p.49.)

He filed a motion to dismiss,

asserting that the vehicle was not subject to being readily made operable at the time he
was arrested. (R., p.92.) Specifically, Mr. Eversole asserted that he was stuck on a
"brick burm" when law enforcement arrived and the vehicle could not be driven.
(R., p.93.)

The State objected, asserting that this was a determination for the jury.

(R., p.107.) The district court denied the motion. (R., p.138.)
Mr. Eversole then filed a motion to suppress asserting that evidence of his blood
alcohol content should be suppressed, because the search violated both the Idaho and
United States Constitution. (R., p.148.) He asserted that a per se implied consent rule
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allowing for warrantless blood draws was unconstitutional, and that the State had not
demonstrated an exigency. (R., p.150.)
Mr. Eversole and the State stipulated to the facts in the motion to suppress.
(R., p.170.) These facts are:
1.

On April 16, 2011, Mr. Eversole was arrested for driving under the
influence in Firth, in Bingham County;

2. Bingham County Sheriff's Deputy Chad Morgan alleges that
Mr. Eversole was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle at the
time of his arrest;
3. At the time of his arrest, Mr. Eversole refused to provide a breath
sample for the purposes of determining his blood alcohol content;
4. Upon this refusal, Deputy Morgan transported Mr. Eversole to Bingham
Memorial Hospital where Tiffany Henderson, a technician in the lab,
drew Mr. Eversole's blood pursuant to Deputy Morgan's request; and
5. Deputy Morgan did not have a warrant for the blood draw.
(R., pp.170-21.) The district court denied the motion to suppress holding that it was
bound by State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007). (R., p.173.) The parties entered into
plea negotiations. (R., pp.182, 190.) Mr. Eversole then entered a binding Alford plea.
(R., p.195.) He preserved the right to appeal any pre-trial motion. (R., p.193.)
However, Mr. Eversole subsequently filed a motion to reconsider the denial of the
motion to suppress, relying on the recently-released opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 133
S.Ct. 1552 (2013).

(R., p.202.)

The State objected, asserting that because

Mr. Eversole had already entered a plea, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
motion to reconsider. (R., p.252.)
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The court denied the motion at the sentencing hearing, holding that it was still
bound by Diaz. 1 (R., p.264.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of six years,
with three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.268.) Mr. Eversole
appealed. (R., p.272.)

The State's assertion that the district court no longer had the authority to reconsider
the suppression motion after the entry of the Alford plea is well taken. However, it is
immaterial for purposes of the argument on appeal, as McNeely applies retroactively to
all cases pending on direct review. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
1
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ISSUES

1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eversole's motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eversole's motion to dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Eversole asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to

suppress because State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300 (2007), has been abrogated by
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013). Alternatively, if this Court

believes that Diaz has not been abrogated by McNeely, Mr. Everole asserts that Diaz
should be overruled.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order on a motion to suppress, this Court defers to the district

court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and exercises free review over the
district court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469,470 (2001).

C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause." A warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a
recognized exception. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
That principle applies to the type of search at issue in this case, which involved a
compelled physical intrusion beneath Mr. Eversole's skin and into his veins to obtain a
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sample of his blood for use as evidence in a criminal investigation. "Such an invasion of
bodily integrity implicates an individual's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations
of privacy." Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558 (2013) (citing

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.,
489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy
burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement.

Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466

U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225 (1993). If evidence is not
seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence
discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court directly addressed a blood draw as a
Fourth Amendment violation.

See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). In

Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at a bar in a bowling
alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car which the
petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree.

Id.

Both the

petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment. Id. At
the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the
petitioner.

Id. at 758.

The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the

petitioner's blood, which indicated intoxication, and such results were admitted at
petitioner's trial.

Id. at 759.

The petitioner objected to the admission of the results,

arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. Id.
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The Schmerber Court found no Fourth Amendment violation stemming from the
warrantless taking of the petitioner's blood under the unique facts of the case.
Specifically, the Court relied on the destruction of blood evidence as a relevant factor in
the exigency determination under the following circumstances: the officer investigating
the accident encountered the defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of
alcohol; the passenger in defendant's car was injured and taken to the hospital; the
investigating officer arrived at the hospital where defendant was being treated almost
two hours after the accident; and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest. The
Schmerber Court stated:

that the percentage of alcohol in the blood
shortly after drinking stops, as the body ..... ,,,,,,,,,,
to
it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt
to secure evidence of blood alcohol content in this case was an
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest.
Id. at 771 (emphasis added).

However, the Court did not establish a per se rule:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the
facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a
cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
Id. (emphasis added).

In 1989, this Court decided State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368 ( 1989).

The

Woolery Court first held that the metabolism of alcohol in the blood provided an inherent

emergency which justified the warrantless search.

Id.

The Court then turned to the

question of whether the test results should have been excluded because the officer did
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not comply with I.C. § 18-8002.

Id. at 371.

After exploring cases from other

jurisdictions, this Court concluded,
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to refuse to submit

to an evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood alcohol level. It is
difficult to believe that the Idaho Legislature would provide an individual
with the statutory right to prevent the state from obtaining highly relevant
evidence when a law enforcement officer has reasonable cause to believe
the individual has committed a crime - whether it would be driving under
the influence, vehicular manslaughter, sale or controlled substances, or
murder. If the driver's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures is complied with, the state should not be prevented
from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol content of the
driver's blood.
Id. at 373 (emphasis added). Thus, this holding in Woolery is that, when the search is
otherwise constitutional, I.C. § 18-8002 does not create a statutory right to revoke
consent. This Court characterized the issue as follows: "the issue on appeal is whether
the trial court erred in admitting appellant's blood alcohol content test results either
because the officer requesting such test did not have reasonable grounds to administer
the test or because appellant was not informed of his rights pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002."
Woolery, 116 Idaho at 370.
In 2002, in an appeal from a driver's license suspension, this Court held that,
"every driver who drives on Idaho roads has impliedly consented to submit to a BAC
when properly requested by an officer." Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).
Halen involved only a license suspension as a result of the petitioner's refusal to take a
BAC test; it was not a criminal case where the defendant sought suppression of the test.
In fact, it appears that no search was done because, after Halen refused, he "was
informed that his driver's license was being suspended based upon his refusal to submit
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to a BAG." Id. at 831. Halen, "never submitted to a SAC test about which to conduct
discovery." Id. at 835.
Building on Halen, in 2007, this Court decided State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300
(2007). In Diaz, the defendant was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol
and was transported by the arresting officer to a local hospital where his blood was
drawn. Id. at 302. The defendant did not physically resist either being transported to
the hospital or the taking of his blood, but orally protested the blood draw.

Id.

The

Defendant was ultimately charged with felony DUI based on prior convictions, and he
sought to suppress his blood test results, arguing that the test was involuntary and not
justified by exigent circumstances. Id.
This Court rejected this argument, concluding that the blood draw could be
justified either by exigent circumstances or consent.

Id.

The Court reasoned that

because the defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving
on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at 303. Given the
Court's finding that the forcible blood draw was consensual, the Court went on to
consider the reasonableness of the blood draw under the Fourth Amendment, in light of
the totality of the circumstances including: (1) whether the procedure was done in a
medically acceptable manner; and (2) whether the procedure was done without
unreasonable force.

Id. Finding the blood draw to be reasonable, the Court then

considered whether I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) permits officers to order involuntary blood
draws absent offenses such as aggravated DUI or vehicular manslaughter. Id. The
Court found that the statute provides no protection to drivers, but only to hospital
professionals, and does nothing more than limit when an officer may request, rather
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than order, hospital personnel to draw a driver's blood against the driver's will. Id. at
303-304.
Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that a
DUI

investigation,

by itself, justifies dispensing with

the warrant requirement.

Missouri v. McNeely 569 U.S._, 133 S.Ct. 1558 (2013). In McNeely, the respondent

was validly stopped and, after declining to take a breath test, was arrested and taken to
a nearby hospital for a blood draw.

Id. at 1557-1558. At the hospital, Mr. McNeely

refused to consent to the blood draw, but the officer ordered the technician to take the
blood anyway.

Id.

The officer never attempted to secure a search warrant.

Id.

Mr. McNeely's blood alcohol content ("SAC") measured at .154 percent. Id. McNeely's
suppression motion was granted and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's order granting suppression of the BAC results, relying on Schmerber. Id.

The

United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits as to
whether "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream establishes a per se
exigency that it suffices on its own to justify and exception to the warrant requirement. ..
" Id. at 1558.

The McNeely Court held that it did not: "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth
Amendment mandates that they do that."

Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1561.

The Court first

recognized the importance of the privacy interest at stake, holding that "absent an
emergency, no less [than a warrant] could be required where intrusions in to the human
body are concerned," and that the importance of a determination by a neutral and
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detached magistrate before law enforcement is allowed to "invade another's body in
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great." Id. at 1558. The Court reiterated
what was seemingly forgotten by lower courts after Schmerber. to determine whether an
officer faced an emergency which would justify alleviating the requirement of a warrant,
the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559.
As part of the analysis, the Court observed that the dissipation of alcohol in the
blood stream is different "in critical respects from other destruction-of-evidence cases in
which the police are truly confronted with a 'now or never' situation." Id. at 1561 (citing

Rhoaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973)).

While BAC evidence from an alleged

drunk driver naturally dissipates over time, its dissipation is gradual and relatively
predictable. Id. In addition, there is always a time gap at issue in each case where the
officer has to transport the suspect to the place where the blood is to be drawn and is
required to read all of the administrative license suspension warnings to each suspect.

Id. These delays, in conjunction with advances in technology making it much easier to
obtain a warrant, making the use of a per se rule unreasonable and violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1561-1562. The Court concluded, "[w]e hold that in drunkdriving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not
constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without
a warrant."

Id. at 1568.

McNeely abrogates Woolery's holding that dissipation of

alcohol is a per se exigency. Id. at 1558, n.2
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1.

The District Court Correctly Held That The State Had Failed To
Demonstrate An Exigency

In this case, the district court first held that it could not conclude from the record
that an exigency existed. (R., pp.177-78.) Mr. Eversole has no dispute with the court's
findings in this regard. However, had the court determined that dissipation, per se, was
an exigency, this would have been error pursuant to McNeely.

2.

The District Court Incorrectly Held That the Blood Draw Was Valid
Pursuant To Implied Consent

The district court next held, pursuant to State v. Diaz, that the blood draw in this
case was justified by implied consent. (R., p.178.) Mr. Eversole submits that Diaz has
been abrogated by McNeely. Additionally, he asserts that, if this Court believes that
McNeely does not address the implied consent issue, Diaz must still be overruled.

In McNeely, while addressing an exigent circumstances issue, the Court held that
the use of a per se rule was unreasonable and violative of the Fourth Amendment.
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1561-1562. However, determining that implied consent justifies

the search in this case simply seeks to replace a per se exigency exception with a per
se implied consent exception. This also violates the Fourth Amendment. The McNeely

Court specifically stated, "[h]ere and in its own courts the State based its case on an
insistence that a driver who declines to submit to testing after being arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol is always subject to a nonconsensual blood test without
any precondition for a warrant. That is incorrect." Id. at 1568. Yet, this is exactly what
Diaz allows, albeit under the theory of implied consent.

The McNeely Court used a totality of the circumstances analysis because a
"case-by case assessment of exigency" was the traditional test.

12

Id. at 1561.

The

traditional test for consent is also a totality of the circumstances test.

See

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho
156 (1980).
circumstances.

Thus, the proper test for determining consent is the totality of the
The State has the burden of proving that consent was "freely and

voluntarily" given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968). "[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a search was in fact
'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 227. And, "knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into
account."

Id.

A blanket holding that implied consent always justifies a warrantless

search where there is reasonable grounds to believe the defendant has been driving
under the influence of alcohol relieves the state of this burden, because proving that
consent has been "implied" does not establish that it was "freely and voluntarily" given.
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that consent can be refused, which is not taken
into consideration with a per se implied consent rule.

Id.

Idaho's implied consent

statute cannot reduce or rescind the basic and fundamental protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979)
(state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make
searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within
the category of statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause,
which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional
searches.")
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The United States Supreme Court did briefly address implied consent statutes in
a section that failed to carry a majority.

However, the Court did not even remotely

suggest that implied consent could constitute a per se exception to the warrant
requirement. The Court stated,
As an initial matter, States have a broad range of legal tools to enforce
their drunk-driving laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking
warrantless nonconsensual blood draws. For example, all 50 States have
adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of
operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if
they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving
offense. See NHTSA Review 173; supra, at 1556 (describing Missouri's
implied consent law). Such laws impose significant consequences
when a motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist's driver's
license is immediately suspended or revoked, and most States allow
the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be used as evidence
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See NHTSA
Review 173-175; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554,
563-564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that the use of
such an adverse inference does not violate the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination).
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566 (emphasis added). Thus, this section of the opinion seems

to take the position that States may use the penalties for withdrawing implied consent to
enforce their DUI laws, not that implied consent is a per se exception to the warrant
requirement.
Further, a recent grant of certiorari suggests that the Supreme Court believes
that McNeely is relevant to the implied consent issue. In Aviles v. State, 385 S.W. 3d
110 (Ct. App. Tex. 2012), the Court of Appeals of Texas held that, despite the fact that
the defendant refused testing, because the warrantless blood draw was conducted in
accordance with Texas's implied consent law, there was no Fourth Amendment
violation. Id. at 115.
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The defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which was granted. Aviles v.
Texas, 2014 WL 102362 (Jan. 13, 2014).

The Supreme Court order states the

following: "the motion for petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition
for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded
to the Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, for further consideration in light of
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S._ (2013)." Thus, far from apparently endorsing implied

consent laws, the Court is now granting writs of certiorari and vacating judgments that
rely solely on implied consent.
Notably, the Supreme Court of Arizona recent issued an opinion in agreement
with Mr. Eversole's argument. See State v. Butler, 302 P.3d 609 (2013). In Butler, the
defendant, a juvenile, admitted to officers that he had driven to school after smoking
marijuana.

Id. at 611.

After being given his warnings pursuant to Arizona's implied

consent statute, the defendant "agreed verbally and in writing to have his blood drawn."
Id. The Butler Court held that, "independent of [Arizona's implied consent statute], the

Fourth Amendment requires an arrestee's consent to be voluntary to justify a
warrantless blood draw. If the arrestee is a juvenile, the youth's age and a parent's
presence are relevant, though not necessarily determinative, factors that courts should
consider in assessing whether consent was voluntary under the circumstances." Id. at
613.
The court then conducted a totality of the circumstances analysis, stating,
Although Tyler did not testify at the suppression hearing, sufficient
evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that he did not voluntarily
consent to the blood draw. At the time, Tyler was nearly seventeen and in
eleventh grade. He had been arrested once previously, but not
adjudicated delinquent. Tyler was detained for about two hours in a school
room in the presence of school officials and a deputy. Neither of his
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parents was present. Tyler initially was shaking and visibly nervous. When
he became loud and upset after being told he was being arrested, the
deputy placed him in handcuffs until he calmed down. A second deputy
sheriff arrived before the blood draw was taken. After removing the
handcuffs, the first deputy read the implied consent admonition to Tyler,
once verbatim and once in what the deputy termed "plain English,"
concluding with the statement, "You are, therefore, required to submit to
the specified tests." Tyler then assented to the blood draw.

Id. at 613-14. The court thus concluded that, despite the implied consent statute and
the fact that the defendant assented to the draw, there was no abuse of discretion by
the juvenile court in its determination that the defendant's consent was involuntary. Id.
In sum, because McNeely rejects per se rules in favor of a totality of the
circumstances test, the district court was incorrect in its conclusion that the blood draw
in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. The State has not shown, based on a totality of the circumstances, that
Mr. Eversole freely and voluntarily consented to the blood draw.

In fact, the record

reveals that he refused testing. The decision of the district court should therefore be
reversed.

3.

Diaz And Any Other Case That Holds That Implied Consent By Itself
Justifies A Blood Draw Should Be Overruled

Mr. Eversole asserts that, even if this Court concludes that McNeely does not
abrogate Diaz, Diaz and any other case that holds that Idaho motorists have impliedly
consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that
the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance should be overruled. It
is well recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis need not be strictly adhered to if the
precedent in question is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or unwise,
or if overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy
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continued injustice. State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000)
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983
(1990)). Mr. Eversole asserts that Diaz was manifestly wrong and should be overruled.
According to Diaz, by obtaining a driver's license, Idaho motorists have impliedly
consented to involuntary blood draws if law enforcement has reasonable suspicion that
the motorist is under the influence of an intoxicating substance. To the extent Diaz
holds that Idaho's implied consent statute creates a per se rule that suffices on its own
as an exception to the warrant requirement, it cannot comport with the Fourth
Amendment.
As is set forth above, the Fourth Amendment requires consent to be
demonstrated by the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho 156 (1980). The State has the
burden of proving that consent was "freely and voluntarily" given.

Schneckloth, 412

U.S. at 222 (citing Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). "[T]he question [of]
whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all
the circumstances." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. And, "knowledge of the right to
refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account."

Id.

Idaho's implied consent

statute cannot reduce or rescind the basic and fundamental protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens by the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979)
(state statute which purports to authorize police in some circumstances to make
searches and seizures without probable cause and without search warrants falls within
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the category of statutes "purporting to authorize searches without probable cause,
which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as authority for unconstitutional
searches.")
Further, consent can be withdrawn at any time.

See Schneckloth, 412 U.S.at

227, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 348 (1991) (holding that a suspect may "delimit as he
chooses the scope of the search to which he consents," in the context of a vehicle
search); United States v. Mcweeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (9 th Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a
suspect is free ... after initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her consent

at any time," in the context of a stop and frisk); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768
(8 th Cir. 2005) ("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United States v.

Lockett, 406 F.3d 907 (3 rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right to
revoke his consent in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348
F.3d 281 (1 st Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v.

Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (10 th Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle
search); United States
of a luggage search).

v. McFarley,

th

991 F.2d 1188 (4 Cir. 1993) (same, in the context

Mr. Eversole submits that irrevocable implied consent cannot

exist in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
By holding that I.C. § 18-8002 provides for consent, by itself, this Court has
abandoned the totality of the circumstances test required by Schneckloth. And, based
upon the fact that this Court noted that the defendant in Diaz refused the testing, this
Court appears to hold that implied consent cannot be withdrawn. These conclusions
are manifestly wrong in light of clear United States Supreme Court precedent regarding
the State's burden to prove consent. Thus, Diaz must be overruled.
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II.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Dismiss

A.

Introduction
Miindful of the district court's factual findings, Mr. Eversole asserts that the

district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court defers to the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous

and exercises free review over the application of the law to the facts. State v. Donato,
135 Idaho 469,470 (2001).

C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Eversole's Motion To Dismiss
Mr. Eversole filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his vehicle was not subject

to being readily made operable at the time he was arrested. (R., p.92.) Specifically,
Mr. Eversole asserted that he was stuck on a "brick burm" when law enforcement
arrived and the vehicle could not be driven. (R., p.93.) The State objected, asserting
that this was a determination for the jury. (R., p.107.)
Mr. Eversole's motion was based on State v. Adams, 142 Idaho 305 (Ct. App.
2005). In Adams, the Court of Appeals held,
The "actual physical control" portion of the DUI statute presupposes the
presence of a vehicle that can be controlled. The threat that is targeted by
this part of the DUI statute is the danger that a parked vehicle will be put in
motion by an intoxicated occupant and thereby pose a risk to the safety of
the occupant and others. This targeted risk does not exist when the
vehicle is not operable, nor subject to being readily made operable, nor in
motion (whether by coasting or being pushed), nor at risk of coasting. If a
vehicle cannot be moved it is not a motor vehicle capable of being
"controlled," and the reason for the statutory prohibition does not exist.
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Consequently, the statute is not violated when the vehicle is not in motion
or susceptible of easily being placed in motion.
Id. at 308. The court stated, "when there is evidence from which a fact-finder could

sensibly conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being rendered operable,
the issue is for the jury." Id.
The court concluded that the State had established that the defendant was
seated in the driver's seat of his vehicle with the motor running, but there was no direct
evidence that the vehicle was capable of moving, nor any circumstantial evidence from
which operability could be inferred. Id. The defendant had asserted that the vehicle was
nonfunctional due to transmission problems.
The district court made the following factual findings at the evidentiary hearing:
In this case, the evidence is that the defendant's vehicle was stuck on a
[burm] in front of Collet's Bar in Firth, Idaho, which is in Bingham County;
that the officer saw the vehicle stuck on the [burm]. Two individuals were
attempting to help get him off the [burm], and the wheels were spinning
when he made contact. He also testified that, with some assistance, the
vehicle could have been removed from the [burm].
(Tr., p.21, Ls.4-12.). The court concluded that this was akin to having a flat tire or a
dead battery, and that "it was just a matter of getting a little more time to get [the
vehicle] off of the [burm]. (Tr., p.21, Ls.21-25.) Therefore, the court denied the motion,
holding that the question of operability was for the jury.
Mindful of the fact that, "when there is evidence from which a fact-finder could
sensibly conclude that the vehicle was reasonably capable of being rendered operable,
the issue is for the jury," Mr. Eversole submits that the district court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss because the vehicle was not operable on the burm.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Eversole respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
orders denying his motion to suppress and motion to dismiss and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this

J1h day of February,

2014.
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